OTTAWA — A new study by three defense experts has ranked Canada near the bottom among democracies for civilian oversight of its military, attributing the shortfall largely to the rigid party discipline that dominates Parliament. The findings, detailed in the book "Overseen or Overlooked? Legislators, Armed Forces and Democratic Accountability," come at a time when the federal government under Prime Minister Mark Carney is gearing up for unprecedented military spending reminiscent of Cold War levels, following years of scandals that have eroded public trust in the armed forces.
The book, authored by academics David Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, and Stephen Saideman, draws on a decade-long analysis comparing Canada's system to those in 14 other democracies. Saideman, an international relations professor at Carleton University, emphasized the stakes involved.
"When the military makes mistakes, it can be catastrophic. So you want to have more overseers, not less,"he told The Canadian Press in an interview.
The project originated in 2007, when Saideman expressed surprise at Parliament's limited role in scrutinizing the Canadian Armed Forces. He noted that parliamentary committees handling defense issues lack security clearances to access classified information, a point he raised with former Prime Minister Paul Martin. Martin suggested benchmarking Canada against parliamentary systems like those in Australia or the United Kingdom, rather than the United States. Taking up the challenge, Saideman and his colleagues spent 18 years traveling and researching, ultimately concluding that Canada's oversight lags far behind its peers.
According to the authors, Canada competes with Japan, Chile, and Brazil for the lowest rankings in legislative relevance to civil-military relations. "We found out that the British and the Australians actually take this stuff much more seriously than we do," Saideman said. The core issue, they argue, stems from Parliament's structure, particularly the House of Commons national defense committee, which serves as the primary venue for oversight.
Members of Parliament on these committees not only lack security clearances but also have limited control over the information they receive and few mechanisms to act on it. Committee agendas, the authors write, are tightly controlled by the governing party, whether in majority or minority situations like the current one under Carney's Liberals. This dynamic, they say, fosters superficial or partisan inquiries rather than substantive review.
Former senior military officials echoed these concerns in interviews with the authors. Retired Chief of the Defence Staff Tom Lawson and former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff Guy Thibault described questions from MPs as often partisan or lacking depth. They prepared for hearings by bracing for hostile, point-scoring exchanges rather than opportunities to provide transparent explanations of military operations.
The pattern, according to the book, is predictable: government MPs pose questions to which they already know the answers, while opposition members seek political advantage over thorough investigation. A stark example occurred in 2021 amid a sexual misconduct scandal that implicated top brass, including General Jonathan Vance and his successor, Admiral Art McDonald. A study into the matter was derailed by a Liberal government filibuster in a minority Parliament, where the government ostensibly had less agenda control.
"The Liberals still held the chair of the committee, and that person basically prevented the committee from producing a report that would have been critical of the defence minister," Saideman explained. "Party discipline is a real constraint." The scandal led to multiple senior officials being sidelined, highlighting broader issues of accountability within the forces.
In contrast, countries with stronger oversight mechanisms offer models for improvement. The United Kingdom, despite sharing Canada's parliamentary system, benefits from looser party discipline and a tradition of independent-minded MPs who act as checks on the government. These "rabble-rousers," as Saideman described them, are often backbenchers unlikely to reach cabinet and thus freer to challenge authority.
Australia's system includes an elected Senate that rarely aligns fully with the governing party in the lower house, providing an additional layer of scrutiny. The authors rank the United States and Germany highest for civilian oversight. In the U.S., the Armed Services Committee wields significant power, controlling budgets and promotions, which empowers individual members of Congress to influence military decisions.
Germany's defense oversight committee stands out for its access to classified materials, authority to approve deployments, and ability to initiate special inquiries with enhanced investigative tools. While Canada's Parliament possesses similar powers in theory—enforceable through the full House of Commons—practical application has been inconsistent. During the Afghanistan war, for instance, a minority Parliament secured classified documents on detainee treatment, but the effort devolved into political battles over disclosure rather than substantive evaluation of military conduct.
"Ultimately, the fight became about that (disclosure of documents), rather than actually, are we fighting the war right, or is the military behaving well in Afghanistan?" Saideman noted. The authors suggest that Canadian MPs may deliberately avoid pursuing security clearances due to political risks. Obtaining one could limit their ability to publicly criticize the government, a concern voiced by figures across the spectrum.
Former NDP MP Randall Garrison, in an interview cited by the authors, opposed clearances because they would restrict open discussion of findings. Similarly, Conservative Leader Pierre Poilievre has long refused one, arguing it would hinder his freedom to critique based on secret information. This reluctance underscores a broader lack of incentive for rigorous oversight, as legislatures in most countries remain "distracted, disinterested or underpowered," per the book.
Yet the authors are not entirely pessimistic. They conclude that reforms are feasible through "reasonable changes" borrowed from other systems, such as enhancing committee independence or granting limited clearances. With Canada's military facing increased scrutiny amid planned spending surges and ongoing fallout from misconduct scandals, the timing for such discussions could not be more pressing.
The report, first published by The Canadian Press on November 29, 2025, arrives as Parliament debates defense priorities. While the government has not yet responded to the study's specifics, experts like Saideman hope it sparks a cross-party dialogue on bolstering accountability. In an era of global tensions, ensuring robust civilian control over the military remains a cornerstone of democratic governance, one that Canada appears ill-equipped to maintain without change.